Abstract-We consider the problem of deriving optimal advertising policies for the spread of innovations in a social network. We seek to compute policies that account for i) endogenous network influences, ii) the presence of competitive firms, that also wish to influence the network, and iii) possible uncertainties in the network model. Contrary to prior work in optimal advertising, which also accounts for network influences, we assume a dynamic model of preferences and we compute optimal policies for either finite or infinite horizons. We also compute robust optimal policies in the case where the evolution of preferences is also affected by external disturbances. Finally, in the presence of a competitive firm, we compute optimal Stackelberg and Nash solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the derivation of optimal advertising strategies in a network of customers, whose preferences are affected by both their neighbors and the incentives provided through advertising. The contribution of this paper lies in the inclusion of three important factors in the derivation of an optimal advertising strategy: i) network effects in the formation of preferences, ii) possible misspecifications/uncertainties in the assumed model of evolution of preferences, and iii) uncertainty in the intentions of a competitive firm that also tries to influence the network.
The literature on optimal advertising starts with the pioneering work of [1] in a monopolistic framework and it has been extended to differential games in oligopolies, a detailed survey of which can be found in [2] . The main objective of this line of work, as very well stated in [3] , is to set up an optimal control problem to determine the optimal rate of advertising expenditures over time in a way that maximizes the net profit of the firm. To this end, prior work has focused on i) the derivation of dynamic models which capture the sales response to advertising, and ii) the computation of an optimal policy of advertising as a function of the sales.
Those models which capture the effect of advertising on sales, usually assume the following behavior: i) advertising effects persist over the current period but diminish with time [1] , ii) marginal advertising effects diminish or remain constant with the size of advertising [4] , iii) advertising effects diminish with the size of sales [1] , [5] , [6] , iv) advertising effects diminish with the size of rivals' advertising [7] , [5] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , and v) advertising effects are affected by word-of-mouth communication (or excess advertising) [12] .
Depending on the formulation of sales response to advertising, models have also been categorized in: i) sales response models (where the state is the rate of sales) [1] , ii) market share models (where the state is the share of the market) [5] , iii) diffusion models (which capture the market growth) [13] , and iv) goodwill models (which capture the evolution of advertising capital) [14] .
Our model is also related to the sales response and diffusion models. It exhibits diminishing returns with time in the absence of advertising effort, constant marginal returns with the size of advertising, and diminishing returns with the size of rivals' advertising. It emanates from traditional advertising models by also considering the effect of wordof-mouth communication through a network of interactions similarly to [15] , [16] . We model network effects similarly to the model of [16] . However, the analysis here is not restricted to the equilibrium state of the evolution of preferences. Instead, the dynamics of network effects become part of the optimization. Using this model, we are able to derive analytically optimal advertising strategies and relate them to centrality measures usually considered in sociology [17] .
We also consider the possibility that we are uncertain of the accuracy of the model, instead of assuming a deterministic update. This form of uncertainty is usually neglected in the previously mentioned literature on optimal advertising. Finally, we also include the possibility that a competitive firm tries to influence the network, introducing a second form of uncertainty. In this case, we compute robust optimal policies through the notion of Stackelberg and Nash solutions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the problem under consideration. Section III discusses some necessary background on dynamic programming. Section IV derives finite-and infinite-horizon optimal policies in a monopoly under unperturbed and perturbed preferences update. Section V computes Stackelberg and Nash solutions in a duopoly. Finally, Section VI presents concluding remarks.
Notation: For any vector x ∈ R n , where x i is its ith entry, − |x| denotes its Euclidean norm, − |x| ∞ max{|x 1 |, ..., |x n |}, − max + (x) max{0, x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n }, − max + 2 (x) max{{0, x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n }\max + (x)}, − for some α > 0, sat(x; α) (y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n ) such that 
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION

A. Evolution of preferences
The problem considers a pair of firms L = {a, b} and a finite set of customers I = {1, 2, ..., n}. We will denote a firm by ℓ ∈ L and a customer by i ∈ I. We assume that the customers are nodes in a given directed network, which is described by a row stochastic matrix W . 1 The matrix W captures how nodes' proclivities towards the product of either a or b are affected by its neighbors.
Let x ℓ i,k ≥ 0 denote the proclivity of node i towards buying the product of firm ℓ ∈ {a, b} at time k, and
be the vector of proclivities over the whole network. We will refer to this vector as the state of firm ℓ and we will denote S ⊂ R n + the set of states. Firm ℓ is able to influence the proclivity of node i towards its product by marketing its product to node i, e.g., by offering discounts or warranties. Let u ℓ i,k ≥ 0 denote the amount of funds that firm ℓ spends on marketing its product to node i at time k, and
be the vector of funds firm ℓ spends over the set of nodes. We will refer to this quantity as the control of firm ℓ. We will also assume that the amount of funds each firm can spend at any given time cannot be larger than M , i.e., i∈I u The specific relation between the controls and the states is motivated by the work of [16] , [18] on social influence network theory and it is described by:
which provides the proclivity of node i at time k + 1 as a convex combination of i) a weighted average of the proclivities of the neighbors and ii) the external influence caused by both own and rival's advertising efforts. The notation −ℓ denotes the complementary set L\ℓ. The matrix Θ is assumed diagonal such that Θ = diag{θ 1 , θ 2 , ..., θ n }, with diagonal entries satisfying 0 ≤ θ i < 1, for all i ∈ I. This constraint has a natural interpretation since it implies that there is no node that completely ignores external influence. Furthermore, in the absence of external influence, it also models diminishing returns with time. We will simplify notation by rewriting the dynamics in the form:
where A ΘW and B I − Θ. Variations of this nominal model will also be considered later on the paper when firms are uncertain about the accuracy of the model. Define also ϕ : C × C → [0, M ] n such that its ith entry 1 A row stochastic matrix A is a nonnegative matrix which also satisfies A1 = 1, i.e., the sum of its entries in any row is equal to 1.
for some α > 0 which denotes market's capacity of getting influenced through advertising. We will refer to this model as a duopoly. When, instead, u −ℓ i,k ≡ 0 for all i ∈ I and k = 0, 1, ..., we will refer to this model as a monopoly.
Note that, due to the definition of ϕ, the model exhibits diminishing returns with the size of rival's advertising efforts. It also includes the effect of word-of-mouth (or excess) advertising due to the assumed network of connections.
B. Objective
The utility of firm ℓ ∈ L at time k is defined as:
where we assume that the reward is linear with the proclivities of the nodes, i.e., V (x
, and the cost is linear with the funds spent on marketing, i.e., C(u
For some discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), the objective of firm f has the following form
over the set of infinite sequences of policies Π ℓ with elements
k is a function from the set of states S to the set of controls C. The above optimization is subject to the dynamics (2). We are going to consider variations of this optimization, especially when dynamics (2) are perturbed and robust optimal policies need to be derived.
C. Assumptions and preliminaries
For the remainder of the paper, assume: Assumption 2.1:
Assumption 2.1 implies that for every unit of advertising effort, the discounted return received from each node is strictly greater than the corresponding cost. This assumption is related to the existence of non-degenerate solutions to the optimization problems considered here. Assumption 2.2 implies that the market's capacity of getting influenced through advertising is larger than the advertising power of both firms. This is not a necessary assumption for the existence of solutions, however, it simplifies the following analysis.
In the presentation of the model, we have also silently assumed that the preferences update and the utility functions are identical for both firms. These assumptions allow for a cleaner presentation, however, as it will become obvious later, it does not change qualitatively the solutions.
III. DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING BACKGROUND
The notation and part of the analysis in this section follows [19] .
A. The dynamic programming algorithm
Denote by J the set of all extended real-valued functions of the form J : S → R * , defined on the state space S and taking values on the extended real line R * = [−∞, +∞]. For time horizon N ∈ N, consider the generic finitehorizon optimization problem:
over any admissible policy π = {µ 0 , µ 1 , ..., µ N −1 } ∈ Π, where µ k ∈ M for all k, and M is the set of functions from the set of states S to the set of controls C. Furthermore, g(x N ) defines the cost at the final stage, which depends only on the final state x N .
The above optimization is subject to the system dynamics
where {w k } denotes a noise sequence taking values in a measurable space (W, F). Denote J * N (x) the optimal value of the N -stage objective function. Finally, assume that
For any function J ∈ J , define the following function
for x ∈ S. Note that (T J)(·) is the optimal value function for the one stage problem that has stage cost g and terminal cost βJ. Also, we will denote by T k the composition of the mapping T with itself k times; i.e., for all k = 1, 2, ...,
For convenience, we also write (T 0 J)(x) = J(x). Similarly, for any function J ∈ J and any policy µ : S → C, we denote:
Again, T µ J may be viewed as the cost function associated with the policy µ for the one-stage problem that has stage cost g and terminal cost βJ.
The dynamic programming algorithm (DP) is the following algorithm; for any k = 1, ..., N compute
with initial condition J 0 (x) = g(x). The last step of the DP algorithm provides the N -stage value, J N (x), x ∈ S. Define
Assumption 3.1: The above sequence {J k } ⊂ J is a nondecreasing sequence satisfying H(x, u, J 1 ) < ∞, and
The above assumption excludes problems where exchangeability of expectation with the limit is not possible. 
B. Infinite horizon problems
Consider now the infinite horizon optimization problem:
over any admissible infinite policy π = {µ 0 , µ 1 , ...} ∈ Π and subject to the system dynamics x k+1 = f (x k , u k , w k ). Let us also define the optimal value of this problem as
The following is a condition on the optimal stationary policy.
Proposition 3.2 (Optimal stationary policy): Assume that
Then, the optimal value of the infinite horizon optimization problem (10) 
(12) Proof: See Proposition 5.5 in [19] .
IV. OPTIMAL POLICY IN MONOPOLY
In this section, we compute the optimal policy of a firm when there is no competitive firm, and the dynamics are either a) unperturbed, or b) perturbed. Since we consider a single firm, we will skip the superscript ℓ for the remainder of this section.
A. Unperturbed dynamics
The dynamics we consider in this section are described by (2) with u
In the remainder of the section, we compute the optimal policy for the 1) finite-horizon, and 2) infinite-horizon optimization problem. 
1) Finite-horizon optimization:
We first consider the finite-horizon optimization
where g(x) v T x defines the utility at the last stage.
Proposition 4.1 (N th stage optimal policy for monopoly):
Consider the finite horizon optimization problem (14) under the dynamics (13) . The N th stage optimal value of the DP iteration, is
The optimal control at time k, for k = 0, 1, ..., N − 1, is u *
Proof: (sketch) We can show this statement by induction. Applying the operator T , defined in (6) for w = 0, on J 0 (x) = g(x) = v T x, we get the optimal value for the first stage. That is:
where the optimal stage control is u * 1 = (u * 1,1 , ..., u * n,1 ) with
Note that the value J 1 (·) is given by expression (15) if we set N = 1 and the optimal stage control u * 1 is given by expression (16) if we set N = 1 and k = 0.
Assume that the value iteration for the N -stage optimization horizon gives (15) with optimal control (16) . Applying the operator T on (15), we get:
otherwise, for i = 1, 2, ..., n. Thus, we showed that the values of the DP iteration and optimal controls are provided by equations (15) and (16), respectively. To show optimality of the DP iteration, note first that:
By Claim 4.1, we have v T (Ã N +1 −Ã N )x ≥ 0, for all x ∈ S. By Assumption 2.1 and the optimal control (16), we also have:
for all x ∈ S and Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. Then, by Proposition 3.1, the DP iteration provides the optimal value of the optimization (14) .
2) Infinite-horizon optimization: We would like to solve the following optimization:
subject to the discrete-time dynamics (13) . Before we compute the solution to the infinite horizon optimization problem, recall the definition of H(x, u, J) from (9) . Given also that J 0 (x) = v T x, it is straightforward to show under Assumption 2.1 that:
Using the Levy-Desplanques theorem (cf., [20] ), we can also show that:
Lemma 4.1: The matrix (I − βA) is non-singular for any β ∈ (0, 1).
Furthermore, note that: Lemma 4.2: Let β ∈ (0, 1) and A ∈ R n×n such that (I − βA) is non-singular. Theñ
Define h
Proposition 4.2 (Optimal Stationary Policy in Monopoly):
Consider the infinite horizon optimization problem (17) under the deterministic and unperturbed dynamics (13) . Then, the stationary policy
for i ∈ I, is an optimal policy for the infinite horizon optimization problem. Also, the optimal infinite value is
Proof: (sketch) Due to Claim 4.2, we have J 0 (x) ≤ H(x, u, J 0 ) for all x ∈ S, u ∈ C. Also, as we showed in the proof of Proposition 4.1, due to Claim 4.1 and Assumption 2.1, J k+1 (x) ≥ J k (x) for every x ∈ S. Thus, Assumption 3.1 is satisfied and, according to Proposition 3.2, in order to show that the stationary policy π * = (µ * , µ * , ...) is optimal, it suffices to show that T µ * (J π * ) = T (J π * ).
Similarly to Proposition 4.1 and taking into account Lemma 4.2 and the identity h
, we can show:
Given that I + βÃ ∞ A ≡Ã ∞ , it is straightforward to show that: T µ * (J π * ) = T (J π * ), which implies that π * is an optimal stationary policy. Also, J π * provides the optimal value of the infinite-horizon optimization.
Trying to interpret the optimal stationary policy (20) , the firm is going to invest the largest possible amount M to the node i which corresponds to the maximum entry of
Note that this decision is affected by the following factors:
1) the effect of the firm's incentives, 1 − θ i , 2) the effect of every unit of advertising effort spent in i on the proclivities of the neighbors of i throughout the optimization horizon, measured by βv T (I − βA) −1 , 3) the cost of every unit of advertising effort, c i .
Note that the quantity h T ∞ defines a centrality measure, since the maximum entry of this vector will provide the highest benefits over time. This is also related to the centrality measure considered by [17] , defined asÃ ∞ 1. Compared with h T ∞ , it represents a measure of the relative importance of nodes when the initial condition is x 0 = 1 and there is no external influence.
Finally, note that the solution does not depend on whether the network is connected or not. This information is included indirectly in the centrality measure h T ∞ . For example, if a node i is not connected to one or more nodes, this will result in a small centrality measure for i.
B. Perturbed dynamics
In this section, we are going to consider a family of perturbations of the nominal model (13), described by
where we have neglected the effect of the second firm. The term q k corresponds to an unknown signal caused possibly by misspecified system dynamics. We will impose the following constraint on the size of any instance of this perturbation sequence:
where η > 0 is a measure of the firm's confidence of the accuracy of the nominal model. Let Q denote the resulting constraint set of disturbances.
Note that due to the presence of the unknown (but bounded) signal q k our initial assumption that S ⊂ R n + may be violated. By construction, the system is input-output stable, therefore an appropriate shift of the state can always guarantee that the dynamics will evolve within the positive cone. In particular, considerx ∈ R n + , such that
for all q k satisfying (23), and define instead the dynamics:
Note that shifting the dynamics byx does not change qualitatively the model, since the state x still describes propensities, but relative tox. For some F ∈ R n×n let us also define the vector lim
subject to the perturbed dynamics (25) and the constraints (23)-(24). Here Σ denotes the set of sequences of policies σ = (ν 0 , ν 1 , ...) of the uncertainty, where ν k is a function from the set of states S to Q. Note also that due to the new shifted dynamics, a utility function of the form g(x, u) = v T x − c T u − γ(x) would have been more appropriate. However, in that case, and since the last term is a constant, the optimal policy of (26) 
Proof: (sketch) We implement the DP iteration where the operator T (·) is defined as
for any x ∈ S. The DP iteration successively gives:
for all N = 1, 2, ..., where u * k and q * k denote the sequences of optimal investments and disturbances, respectively. In particular, u * k = (u * 1,k , ..., u * n,k ) and q * k = (q * 1,k , ..., q * n,k ), are such that
and r
In other words, the disturbance places all its weight on the maximum (in absolute value) entry of r k .
Note also that under condition (24): H(x, u, q, J 0 ) ≥ J 0 (x), for all x ∈ S, u ∈ C * , q ∈ Q * . Thus, from Proposition 3.2, the DP iteration provides the optimal value.
Consider the stationary policy (27) for the monopolistic firm and the stationary policy σ * = (ν * , ..., ν * ) for the disturbance such that r
Following similar reasoning to the proof of Proposition 4.2, it is straightforward to show that T (µ * ,ν * ) (J (π * ,σ * ) ) = T (J (π * ,σ * ) ), i.e., (π * , σ * ) provides the optimal lower value. The sequence of policies (π * , σ * ) also provides the optimal upper value, defining this way a solution to the min-max optimization problem.
Note, that the model exhibits a certainty equivalence property, where the optimal policy of the perturbed model coincides with the optimal policy of the unperturbed model.
V. OPTIMAL POLICY IN DUOPOLY
The presence of the competitive firm introduces a new source of uncertainty. We will assume that either i) the competitive firm has the form of a competitive fringe which tries to enter the market, introducing a notion of sequential optimization (expressed by a Stackelberg solution), or ii) both firms have the ability of simultaneous play (expressed by a Nash solution).
Each firm ℓ ∈ {a, b} solves the following optimization:
subject to the system dynamics
Definition 5.1 (Stackelberg solution): A Stackelberg solution is a pair of policies
and, furthermore,
In the above definition of a Stackelberg solution, we will refer to firm ℓ as the leader and firm −ℓ as the follower. Note that the definition implies that the leader ℓ announces first its policy, while the follower −ℓ reacts to that policy.
Definition 5.2 (Nash solution): A Nash solution is a pair of policies
Note that the definition of a Nash solution implicitly assumes a simultaneous announcement of policies from both firms. Proof: (sketch) It is straightforward to verify that (π ℓ * , π −ℓ * ) is a Nash solution for any ℓ ∈ {a, b}. Either one is the best response to the other for the infinite horizon optimization. Assume now that ℓ has the opportunity to announce first its strategy. In order to show that (π ℓ * , π −ℓ * ) defines a Stackelberg solution, we need to verify that the leader's policy π ℓ * guarantees maximum return over all possible announced policies. It is straightforward to show that any announced policy that does not allocate all available funds to arg max + (h ∞ ) will result to a best response of the follower that can only decrease leader's optimal value. Proposition 5.1 provides a closed-loop Nash solution. This is not necessarily the unique Nash solution. In fact, it is straightforward to see that the model also admits mixtures as Nash solutions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We addressed the problem of deriving optimal advertising strategies in a network of customers. We proposed a model of sales response to advertising that captures most of the observed phenomena in real-world marketing competition. Contrary to prior work the dynamics of network effects were also part of the optimization. First, we provided an analytical solution to the optimal advertising problem in the absence of competitive firms. The solution can be related to previously introduced centrality measures in sociology. We also considered a perturbed model which incorporates possible uncertainties in the nominal model, and we derived robust optimal strategies. An interesting observation is that the model exhibits a certainty equivalence property. Finally, we computed robust policies in the presence of a competitor.
